[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]
.Moreover, the dominance of the liberal paradigm means that inrelation to such networks we should talk more accurately of globalliberal governance (Dillon and Reid 2000).While establishing durablestructures and relationships, global governance is also fluid, mutableand non-territorial.New relations of governance can emerge in res-ponse to changing perceptions and assessments of risk.Global liberal44 Duffield 3a 24/4/07 11:50 Page 45STRATEGIC COMPLEXES AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCEgovernance is an adaptive and selectively inclusive system.It is aradical project that thrives on creating networks that bridge traditionalboundaries, specialisms and disciplines.Its rationale is that of informa-tion sharing, comparative advantage and coordination.While gover-nance networks form around specific issues as problems mutate,discrete networks themselves can link and integrate their activities.Inresponse to the new wars and the merging of development andsecurity, innovative strategic complexes linking state and non-stateactors, public and private organisations, military and civilian organisa-tions, and so on have emerged.Such strategic complexes are the oper-ational basis of liberal peace and an important and formative nexus ofglobal governance.Regarding the new wars, the massed armies, complex weaponssystems and political blocs developed during the Cold War no longerrepresent an adequate response (van Creveld 1991).In their place,strategic complexes linking state and non-state actors have expanded.Itis interesting to note that this response tends to imitate the nature of thenew wars themselves, as in the blurring of conventional distinctionsbetween people, army and government, and the intermingling of suchactors.The liberal analogue includes the increasing interconnectionbetween military and civilian organisations such as NGOs and privatecompanies, together with the growing influence of the latter withregard to official government policy.In many respects, the organisa-tions and linkages that make up liberal peace also constitute a liberalway of war.The merging of development and security has beenessential for such strategic complexes to emerge.Among other things,in defining conflict as a social problem, that is, as underdevelopmentbecoming dangerous, it has allowed new and non-traditional networksto be mobilised in the cause of security.War is no longer aClausewitzian affair of state, it is a problem of underdevelopment andpolitical breakdown and, as such, it requires development as well assecurity professionals to conjoin and work together in new ways.Notonly does this require new strategic networks going beyond the state, italso demands a reworking of what we understand to be loyalty and theconditions under which people are willing to sacrifice their lives.Payment or other non-patriotic forms of inducement increasingly moti-vate participation.The merging of security and development has been institutionallyfacilitated by the privatisation and subcontracting of former statedevelopment and security responsibilities.Innovative networks linkinggovernments, NGOs and the business sector have begun to emerge andconsolidate.These strategic complexes, while dedicated to the cause of45 Duffield 3a 24/4/07 11:50 Page 46GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE NEW WARSliberal peace are, simultaneously, the new war-fighting organisationsthat van Creveld (1991: 192) perceptively predicted would emerge inresponse to the challenge of the new wars.Given that conflict is highlyimitative, in many respects the organisational forms of liberal peaceand the new wars are similar.They are both based on new, mutable andincreasingly privatised local global linkages and networks.In the caseof the North, liberal strategic complexes are assuming responsibility forsecuring peace on the borders of global governance.This chapter exam-ines some of the conditions necessary for the emergence of such com-plexes, indicates the types of linkage that are developing between thestrategic actors involved, and discusses a few of their characteristics.The qualification of nation-state competenceTransforming whole societies in the South is beyond both the abilityand the legitimacy of individual Northern governments.Not only doesthis require partnership with the South but, increasingly, this responsi-bility has been taken over by the North s emerging strategic complexeslinking state and non-state actors.In understanding the nature of suchnetworks, we have to consider briefly the issue of globalisation andhow it relates to the changing competence of the nation state.The termglobalisation has a number of different and even conflicting meanings.Within the international financial institutions (IFIs) and among freemarket economists, for example, globalisation is largely understood interms of a world-wide economic and political convergence aroundliberal market principles and the increasing real-time integration ofbusiness, technological and financial systems (Held et al.1997).Basedon an expansion and deepening of market competition, globalisation isargued to be synonymous with an irresistible process of economic,political and cultural change that is sweeping all national boundariesand protectionist tendencies before it.Indeed, for a country to remainoutside this process is now tantamount to its marginalisation andfailure
[ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]