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.S.-Singapore cooperation.The Burma issue remained an area of some difference with the United States.Singaporeaninterlocutors registered concern about U.S.isolation and sanctions policy ascounterproductive to achieving change in the country.They noted that isolation is what theBurmese junta thrives on and that greater flexibility and balance in the U.S.approach isnecessary for progress, both at a political and humanitarian level.Singaporeans commentedthat while Burma was embarrassing to ASEAN, it was important for the country to remainintegrated as a member of the grouping to avoid falling more deeply into the Chinese camp.Concerning China, Singaporean perspectives were quite complex and overall considerably wary.Interlocutors noted that even as Singapore called for greater U.S.engagement in East Asia,Singapore s interests and geography will require that its relations with China be positive andconstructive.They emphasized that China will continue to be an extremely important factorin the city-state s development given China s proximity and Singapore s increasing reliance onChina for its economic growth, with China now Singapore s third-largest trade partner.Nonetheless, Singaporean interlocutors were quite frank in voicing worry about the evolutionof China over time as a potential coercive factor in regional affairs.They noted that whileBeijing s charm offensive has had some success in recent years, it has begun to be replacedquietly by a harder hand beneath the velvet glove.They noted maritime issues such as theSouth China Sea as a particular area of concern, although their concerns extended beyond themaritime arena.One senior interlocutor explained candidly that we have an 800-poundgorilla at our back and it s not comfortable.We don t want a China that tells us what to do. He noted a widespread concern in Singapore that China would bully the city-state should itbecome the only show in town. That said, Singaporean interlocutors acknowledged thatthey, like others in the region, consider what China thinks when making policy decisions.38 | u.s.alliances and emerging partnerships in southeast asia Singaporeans nonetheless urged the United States to be rather subtle in its approach toSoutheast Asia, and Singapore in particular, as it relates to China.They commented that whileSoutheast Asian nations worried privately about China they would not do so publicly sincethey have to live with the gorilla in their neighborhood.Singapore s strategic approach,therefore, has sought to encourage China to integrate itself into the ASEAN system, and theinternational system more broadly, to embed China in regional norms.The idea is that byincluding China in regional institutions, it may help constrain Beijing s power and encourageBeijing to act as a responsible stakeholder in international affairs.At the same time, Singaporeans expressed support for India s increasing involvement in regionalaffairs.Singapore has been an important facilitator in India s growing engagement ofSoutheast Asia, and interlocutors expressed desire that India pay more attention to the region.They consider India a power big enough to help balance China s influence.They noted,however, that a nonaligned mentality still pervades much of New Delhi officialdom and thatmany Indian officials with whom they engage do not react well to the notion of balancing.Singaporeans also betrayed frustration with India s sluggish bureaucracy and inability tomove quickly on new initiatives.Nonetheless, it was clear that India remains an importantnew potential strategic partner for Singapore, as the city-state seeks regional engagement of ahost of major powers to help promote development and shape a stable balance of power inEast Asia.Likewise, Singaporeans viewed Japan as a welcome player and partner in regional political,economic, and security affairs.To policymakers and strategists, Japan s engagement both inthe context of the U.S.-Japan alliance and otherwise is considered a useful element ofregional security, development, and balance of power looking forward.If there was anyconstraint to further progress in Singapore s partnership with Japan, interlocutors noted, itcame from the Japanese side: from Japan s continuing self-imposed constraints oninternational activity and sclerotic political system that is preventing decisive action and freshinitiative.Interlocutors also commented that Japan lacks a comprehensive strategy forSoutheast Asia, its agencies do not work in tandem, its leadership often has a difficult timeseeing others points of view, and its regional influence as a result has declined over the past15 years.What worried Singaporeans the most, however, was the prospect of a clash of great powers inthe region that could lead to development of distinct blocs and where Singapore would beforced to choose sides explicitly.Like all others in Southeast Asia, Singaporean interlocutorswarned, Singapore did not want to be put in a position of having to choose among greatpowers as all were essential to the future stability and development of the city-state and theregion.In the end, both official and nonofficial Singaporean interlocutors considered the U.S.-Singaporerelationship to be in excellent shape, with few obstacles in the way of continuing this trend fromthe Singapore side.One might note that Singapore s controlled (virtual) one-party politicalsingapore | 39 system means official policy assigning priority to strong political and security ties with theUnited States is not debated.But neither does it appear controversial.While generationalchange may lead to more demands for political and civic freedoms, there is little indicationthat would mean a fundamentally different approach to Singapore s relations with the UnitedStates or the rest of the region.From all indications, Singaporeans appear to remain ratherinstinctively pro-American in orientation, enamored of U.S
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