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.18This is a remarkable letter for one Conservative backbencher to be writing to another even in the interesting times of 1956 showing the extent to which privilegedinformation on the plot to overthrow Nasser was shared within the inner core of theSuez Group.The third important strand to Amery s activities were the links with the Frenchgovernment.Throughout the Suez crisis, Amery maintained contact with French Prime16 Amery MSS, AMEJ 648, diary entry 18 August 1956.17 This was Captain Wilfred Dunderdale, a British intelligence officer in SIS (later MI6)between 1921 and 1959.Born in 1899, Dunderdale was near the end of his career.A long-standing friend of Ian Fleming, it is reputed that the author based his creation, James Bond,upon Dunderdale s personality and career.18 Waterhouse MSS, Amery to Waterhouse, 3 September 1956. Julian Amery and the Suez Operation 73Minister Guy Mollet s office, Defence Minister Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, theFrench embassy in London, as well as other French politicians and journalists.Thiswas particularly important during the Conservative Party Conference in October 1956.Amery was determined to re-inject steam into the issue which seemed to be goingcold following the Suez Group s failure to prevent Eden referring the matter to theUnited Nations in early September after the debacle of Dulles s proposal for a SuezCanal Users Association.The Conservative Party conference also took place againstthe background of looming crisis elsewhere in the Middle East, and the increasinglylikelihood of war between Israel and Jordan.At Llandudno, Amery liaised with GuyMollet to maintain pressure on Eden and the British Cabinet for the use of force.As Mollet instructed Amery on the telephone: Do your best to keep up the pressureas this may be our last chance to fuel the fire. 19 Amery needed little encouragement.Together with fellow Suez Group MPs, he successfully engineered a tough amendmentto the anodyne resolution in the debate on foreign policy, calling for robust policy inthe Middle East.Amery spoke passionately in the subsequent debate:If the discussions at the Security Council do not bring Nasser to his senses, then I believethe process of negotiation will be exhausted.Any further compromise would meansurrender.We must go forward with American approval if we can get it; without it if theywithhold it; and against their wishes if we must.20The Suez Group s concerted effort at Llandudno was of significant importancein Eden s later decision to use force.While the party conference was proceeding, theForeign Secretary was negotiating in New York with the Egyptian Foreign Minister;and Selwyn Lloyd, whose own instinct was for a diplomatic solution, was optimisticabout the prospect of a negotiated settlement.Eden, who remained convinced in thelast resort action would be necessary, was increasingly fearful that Britain s positionwas being eroded.Egypt appeared confident the crisis was burnt out ; therefore,it was imperative that we should not be inveigled away in negotiations with thefundamentals to which we have held all along.Above all, he was insistent thatBritain should not be parted from the French.21 The Prime Minister did nothingto defuse the charged atmosphere at Llandudno.Eden, who had just risen from hissick bed, wound up the conference on 13 October 1956 with a pugnacious speech.To tremendous applause, he promised his government would stand firm & I havealways said force is the last resort, but it cannot be excluded. 22 Yet the followingmorning, the Prime Minister gave Lloyd instructions to accept UN negotiationswith Egypt, which was an effective instruction to stand down military preparations.Given his bellicose speech of the previous afternoon, this would have increased hisproblems with the party in Parliament and the country immeasurably.Later that day,Eden received a deputation from General Challe and acting Foreign Minister AlbertGazier, suggesting a plan of collusion between Israel, France and Britain.19 Lord Amery, interview with author.20 The Times, 13 October 1956.21 TNA, PREM 11/1102, Eden to Selwyn Lloyd telegrams T.440/56, 7 October 1956;T.445/56, 8 October 1956 and 12 October 1956.22 Eden s speech, reported in The Times, 15 October 1956. 74 Reassessing Suez 1956The importance of Amery s links with the French government cannot beexaggerated.Preoccupied with the growing Algerian crisis, the French feared Edenwould weaken and not seek the desired confrontation with Nasser by no later than theend of October (when the weather in the region would preclude a military assault),leaving France isolated; talking to the Americans was a waste of time as they willnever authorize any action likely to provoke the fall of Nasser at any rate until after theUS presidential elections.23 Throughout the crisis, Amery stayed in close touch withthe French embassy in London and Mollet s private office
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