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.The problem of preserving that match has as its core the "frame problem" ofdifferent perspective, perhaps some progress can be made by consid-Artificial Intelligence which arises for planning systems that must reason about theeffects of contemplated actions.See McCarthy and Hayes 1969, and Dennett 1978a,ering the origins of the problematic distinctions in the context of thechapter 7, and 1984c.It is either the most difficult problem AI must and can even-theoretical problems that gave birth to them.tually solve, or the reductio ad absurdum of mental representation theory. 174The Intentional Stance Beyond Belief 175De re and de dicto Dismantledplan has its recommendations.Quotation will not fail us in the way abstrac-tion did.Moreover, conspicuously opaque as it is, quotation is a vivid form towhich to reduce other opaque constructions.(1960, p.212; see also p.216 andUnless we are prepared to say that "the mind cannot get beyond the circle ofQuine 1969)its own ideas," we must recognize that some of the things in the world mayin fact become objects of our intentional attitudes.One of the facts aboutSuch lumpy predicates are not much use, but Quine has long pro-Oliver B.Garrett is that he once lived in Massachusetts; another is that thefessed his skepticism about the possibility of making any sense of thepolice have been seeking him for many years; another is that I first learned of23refractory idioms of intentionality, so he needs opacity only to pro-his existence in my youth; and another is the fact that I believe him still to bevide a quarantine barrier protecting the healthy, extensional part of ain hiding.(Chisholm 1966)sentence from the infected part.What one gives up by this tactic.These are facts about Oliver B.Garrett, and they are not trivial.InQuine thinks, is nothing one cannot live without: "A maxim of shallowgeneral, the relations that exist between things in the world in virtueanalysis prevails: expose no more logical structure than seems useful for theof the beliefs (and other psychological states) of believers are relationsdeduction or other inquiry at hand.In the immortal words of Adolfwe have very good reasons to talk about, so we must have someMeier, where it doesn't itch, don't scratch." (1960, p.160) With per-theory or theories capable of asserting that such relations hold.Nosistence and ingenuity, Quine staves off most of the apparent de-methodologically solipsistic theory will have that capacity, of course.mands for relational construals of intentional idioms, but, faced withThe same conclusion is borne in on Quine, the founding father ofthe sort of case Chisholm describes, he recognizes an itch that mustthe contemporary literature on the so called de re and de dicto distinc-be scratched.tion, and it requires him to give up, reluctantly, the program of treat-The need of cross-reference from inside a belief construction to an indefiniteing all attribution of belief (and other psychological states) assingular term outside is not to be doubted.Thus see what urgent information"referentially opaque." Nonrelationality is the essence of Quine'sthe sentence "There is someone whom I believe to be a spy" imparts, inconcept of referential opacity; a context in a sentence is referentiallycontrast to "I believe that someone is a spy" (in the weak sense of "I believeopaque if the symbols occurring within it are not to be interpreted as there are spies").(1960, p.148)playing their normal role; are not, for instance, terms denoting whatThis then sets the problem for Quine and subsequent authors: "Beliefthey normally denote, and hence cannot be bound by quantifiers.contexts are referentially opaque; therefore it is prima facie meaning-Frege maintained a similar view, saying that terms in such contextsless to quantify into them; how then to provide for those indispens-had an oblique occurrence, and referred not to their ordinary denota-able relational statements of belief, like 'There is someone whomtions, but to their senses.Quine's ontological scruples about FregeanRalph believes to be a spy'?" (Quine 1956)senses and their many kin (propositions, concepts, intensions, attri-Quine is led to acknowledge a distinction between two kinds ofbutes, intentional objects.) force him to seek elsewhere for anbelief attribution: relational attributions and notional attributions, in hisinterpretation of the semantics of opaque contexts (see, e.g., Quineterms, although others speak of de re and de dicto attributions, and1960, p.151).In the end, he handles the myriads of different com-Quine acknowledges that it comes to the same thing.(It does come toplete belief-predicates (one for each attributable belief) by analogythe same thing in the literature, but if Quine had meant what hewith direct quotation; to have a belief (nonrelationally construed) is toought to have meant by "relational" and "notional" it would not havebe related to no object or objects in the world save a closed sentence.come to the same thing, as we shall see.) This sets in motion theTo believe is to be in an otherwise unanalyzed state captured by acottage industry of providing an adequate analysis of these two dif-lumpy predicate distinguished from others of its kind by containingan inscription of a sentence which it in effect quotes.23."One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability ofintentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of intention, or asWe might try using, instead of the intensional objects, the sentences them-showing the baselessness of intentional idioms and the emptiness of a science ofselves.Here the identity condition is extreme: notational identity.Theintention.My attitude, unlike Brentano's, is the second." (Quine 1960, p.221) Beyond Belief 177176The Intentional StanceThis is a fact about people, but also about snakes.That is to say,ferent kinds of belief attribution.Unfortunately, three differentstrains of confusion are fostered by Quine's setting of the problem,(2) Snakes are believed by many to be slimy
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